China’s Foray Across the Hindu Kush: Too little! Too Late?
Raghav Sharma
Email: sharmarag@gmail.com
Doctoral Candidate, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy and Research Analyst, Kabul Center for Strategic Studies
Much is being made of the recently concluded visit of Zhou Yongkang, member of standing committee of the Political bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, to Kabul, making him the highest ranking leader to set foot on Afghan soil in 46 years. The four-hour visit, kept a secret till Zhou’s departure from Kabul, which concluded with both sides inking economic and security agreements- most notable being the agreement to train 300 Afghan policemen in China.
While the Chinese decision to accelerate bilateral relations just a bit is certainly a welcome decision but what underlies this change to engage more in Afghanistan and are these efforts simply too little, too late?
Zhou’s visit, which took further in spirit the recent up gradation of bilateral ties to the level of strategic cooperation in June 2012, has to be mounted on a larger canvas of events i.e. the impending drawdown of the international military combat mission in 2014 and fears of growing instability and violence in the region. While on the one hand China has been uncomfortable with a large and prolonged US military presence in its backyard yet on the other hand it remains aware of inability and unwillingness of any of the regional powers to step into that role. Infact China’s political engagement with the country has been rather low profile, with a measly US $ 200 million being pledged in aid over the past decade. This reluctance may in large measure stem from the Chinese reluctance to be too closely identified with the Western military effort in the country, which has increasingly come under question, in turn rendering Chinese interests at home and overseas vulnerable to greater attacks. Second, Beijing at-least in the initial years following the collapse of the Taliban remained fairly confident of its ability to contain radicalism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan through Pakistan- after all Beijing had one of the best un-official relationships with the Taliban. However today with the Pakistani state itself being incapable and unwilling on some counts to rein in extremism, Beijing believes it must initiate greater independent political contact with Kabul.
China’s concerns particularly centring on proliferation of drugs and extremism was vividly reflected at the SCO convention of June 2012, where Afghanistan was admitted as an Observer. Here the Chinese President Hu Jintao called upon his Afghan counterpart to work jointly to combat “three forces” of terrorism, separatism and trans-border crimes like drug trafficking (Xinhua, 8 June 2012).
Although Chinese efforts at enhancing economic and political ties are appreciable however it appears to be a case of too little, too late. While China is concerned about instability in the neighbourhood, and it has to a limited extent tried to cultivate political relations with Kabul independent of Rawalpindi yet there is nothing to indicate a radical shift in its policy of viewing Afghanistan through the Pakistani prism. The significance of proximity between Islamabad and Beijing has not been lost on the Afghan government, with the Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Janan Musazai remarking “China has close ties with Afghanistan. It also has very close ties with Pakistan and if it can help advance the vision of peace and stability in Afghanistan we welcome it.” (Reuters 3 June 2012).
Even stepped up cooperation has resulted in the addition of a mere US $150 million in aid which will be rooted through the Afghan Ministry of Finance and an offer to train a mere 300 policemen. This effort is clearly not enough, given both the magnitude of the challenge faced in Afghanistan and also in light of China’s growing political and economic stature. Significantly so far China has also not signalled any intent to contribute financially to the multi-lateral fund being set up to fund the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)- principal pillar on whom the prospect for any stability rests- at a cost of US $ 4.1 billion annually. China’s reluctance on this count can be interpreted in three ways: a desire not to be too closely identified with Western backed force; second a lack of confidence in capabilities of the ANSF to survive following US withdrawal and third a desire to keep open the option of re-forging ties with the Taliban should the current order collapse.
It is imperative for Beijing to realise that if it wishes to contribute towards securing Afghanistan in earnest it must do more in terms of building up and solidifying the key pillars of the Afghan state. This can happen in earnest only if it breaks with its past policy of currying favour with radical, extremist elements in the hope that it would help it contain the problem and prevent it from seeping into China. This has not worked in the past, as Uighur extremists continued to find safe haven in Afghanistan under the Taliban and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan into China has been on the rise. Moreover given the increasing inability and unwillingness on part of Rawalpindi to control extremist actors Beijing must understand that it can no longer hedge its bets on Pakistan. Finally, given the growing Chinese investments and interests in the mining and hydro-carbons sector it would be untenable for China to secure its commercial interests without seeking to help create state institutions which could help secure these.
Thus, while Zhou’s visit is a welcome sign but given the magnitude of the challenges faced in Afghanistan it is a case of too little, too late! Beijing needs to recalibrate its Afghan strategy and step up to the plate, else the dragon will find navigating its way through the passes of the Hindu Kush not quite what it had bargained for.
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